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In his recent interesting paper in this journal, Laurence Seidman [2005] argues that 
the ‘new classical counter-revolution that began in the 1970s has been a false path for 
macroeconomics.’ Professor Seidman’s argument is based on ﬁ  ve main points, namely:
1.  in their critique of Keynesian economics, Lucas and Sargent [1978] 
highlighted the failure of Keynesian models to explain the stagﬂ  ation 
of the 1970s but failed even to mention the OPEC oil shock in their 
discussion; in contrast, once Keynesian economists had adapted the 
AD-AS framework to take into account the OPEC oil shock induced 
shifts of the AS curve, not only could Keynesian economics explain US 
economic history between 1960-73, it could also provide a plausible 
explanation of the ‘stagﬂ  ation’ experience of the post 1973 period (see 
Blinder [2002]);
2.  ‘the only place that the new classical counter-revolution succeeded 
was in academia’, it had little impact during either the Volker or 
Greenspan eras, during which time practical macroeconomic poli-
cymaking remained ‘thoroughly Keynesian, continuously practicing 
countercyclical monetary policy to combat both inﬂ  ation and recession;’ 
furthermore, new classical economics did not have any inﬂ  uence in 
the wider business community; 
3.  the predictions of the new classical monetary models were refuted by 
the experience of the 1982 recession in the US, and both real business 
cycle theory, and the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis do not stand 
up to empirical scrutiny;
4.  ‘undergraduate textbooks that dominate the market continue to use 
a Keynesian framework;’
5.  the attraction of new classical economics within academia has been 
driven mainly by the ‘new set of mathematical models that it provided 
for new PhD candidates and assistant professors.’542 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
In this paper I provide a critique of Professor Seidman’s arguments especially 
with respect to point 2 above. 
OIL AND THE STAGFLATION OF THE 1970S
Seidman correctly points out that once Keynesian models were suitably modiﬁ  ed 
during the 1970s they performed remarkably well. The work of Robert Gordon, Edmund 
Phelps and Alan Blinder was important in creating the necessary groundwork that 
allowed the Keynesian model to adapt and evolve in a way which enabled monetarist 
and supply-side inﬂ  uences to be absorbed within the existing Keynesian framework 
[Snowdon and Vane, 2005]. Given these constructive developments in Keynesian 
economics, Seidman is critical of Lucas and Sargent [1978] for ignoring the impact of 
the OPEC oil shocks in their famous critique of Keynesian economics. There are two 
important points to be made relating to Seidman’s criticism. First, Lucas and Sargent’s 
contribution should, at least in part, be viewed as a brilliant and provocative exercise 
in the use of anti-Keynesian rhetoric [Backhouse, 1997]. While many economists did 
not accept that the case against Keynesian economics had been made conclusively, 
Lucas and Sargent argued that the ﬂ  aws in Keynesian economics were ‘fatal’ and 
that such models were subject to ‘econometric failure on a grand scale.’ However, 
the models that Lucas and Sargent were referring to were the 1960s-style Keynes-
ian macroeconometric ‘system of equation’ models, for example, those constructed by 
Ando and Modigliani, and Klein and Goldberger. In an interview [Snowdon and Vane, 
1998], Lucas, commented on his 1978 paper as follows:
Sargent and I were talking about a particular set of [1960s Keynesian] 
models which we were completely clear about…If a completely different 
class of models comes up which people like to call Keynesian, of 
course our criticisms can’t apply. You can’t write a paper in 1978 
criticising work done in 1988.
Second, while the contribution of the oil supply-shock to stagﬂ  ation receives sup-
port from several notable economists, including Alan Blinder, James Tobin, and Robert 
Solow, it is important to note that this issue remains highly controversial since there 
are a variety of explanations of how the ‘Great Peacetime Inﬂ  ation’ of the 1970s was 
ignited. These explanations range from the policy errors (referred to by Seidman) 
made during the Kennedy-Johnson years [Tobin, 1987]; the use of the wrong model 
(stable Phillips curve) for policy purposes [Taylor, 1992, 1997a; Mayer, 1999; Sargent, 
1999; Romer and Romer, 1997; Romer, 2005]; the ‘monetary policy neglect hypothesis’ 
[Nelson, 2004; Nelson and Nikolov, 2004]; excessive demand due to overoptimistic 
estimates of the output gap originating with the productivity slowdown beginning in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s [Orphanides, 2003]; and DeLong’s [1997] hypothesis 
that the ‘Great Peacetime Inﬂ  ation’ was an inevitable result of what he calls the 
‘Shadow of the Great Depression.’ 
It is now generally recognised that during Arthur Burns’s tenure as Chairman at 
the Fed (February 1970 – January 1978), monetary policy was excessively expansionary 543 NEW CLASSICAL MACRODYNAMICS
compared to the Volker-Greenspan era [Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999, 2000]. Lucas 
and Sargent’s failure to consider the 1970s Keynesian developments with respect to 
supply-shocks is, therefore, entirely understandable given that Lucas regards the ‘di-
rect impact of the OPEC shock’ as ‘minor’, and that a (rational) expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve framework, combined with Keynesian neglect of monetary inﬂ  uences, 
offer a much more convincing explanation of the origins of the ‘Great Inﬂ  ation’ from 
a new classical perspective [Snowdon and Vane, 1998]. Indeed, Lucas [1981] regards 
the Friedman-Phelps model, and the veriﬁ  cation of its predictions as providing ‘as 
clear cut an experimental distinction as macroeconomics is ever likely to see.’
Scepticism relating to the inﬂ  ationary impact of oil price hikes is not conﬁ  ned 
to Lucas. In his Nobel Lecture, Milton Friedman [1977, 463], also rejects the OPEC 
explanation of stagﬂ  ation, since ‘before the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973, most 
countries show a clearly marked association of rising inﬂ  ation and rising unemploy-
ment.’ Ben Bernanke, believes that ‘the role the conventional wisdom has attributed 
to oil price increases in the stagﬂ  ation of the 1970s has been overstated’ [Chappell 
and McGregor, 2004, 247-8] and he places strong emphasis on monetary policy ac-
commodation as the key factor in explaining how higher foreign oil prices could have 
translated into domestic inﬂ  ation in the US [Bernanke, 2002; See also Taylor, 1998a; 
Clarida et al., 1999, 2000; Rebelo, 2005]. 
Recently, this debate has been reignited by Barsky and Kilian [2002; 2004] who 
highlight a number of conceptual and empirical difﬁ  culties arising from the oil price 
shocks explanation of macroeconomic instability. First, the belief that exogenous 
political events in the Middle East, including the activities of the OPEC cartel, cause 
recessions and/or inﬂ  ation via oil price shocks, as well as contributing signiﬁ  cantly to 
the 1970s productivity slowdown in the US and other major industrial economies, is a 
hypothesis that is not strongly supported by the evidence. For example, inﬂ  ation was 
already accelerating in the US before the ﬁ  rst OPEC oil shock of 1973-74, subsequent 
oil shocks in 1990 and 1999 did not lead to ‘stagﬂ  ation’, and the recession that started 
in the US in 1990 was already underway before the rise in oil prices. Moreover, Bar-
sky and Kilian [2004, 125] offer a persuasive argument that the causation runs from 
macroeconomic activity to the price of oil. The power of the OPEC cartel to manipulate 
oil prices is ‘far from exogenous’ and in fact responds endogenously to macroeconomic 
conditions in the US economy. Finally, Barsky and Kilian argue that the experience 
of ‘stagﬂ  ation’ in the 1970s is quite consistent with the standard expectations-aug-
mented Phillips curve framework. Evidence that actual unemployment was below 
the natural rate (or NAIRU) for the mid-to-late 1960s and early 1970s is provided by 
Reis [2003] and Gordon [2003]. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) minutes 
also indicate that the Fed was aiming to achieve an unemployment target less than 
the natural rate. Figure 1 illustrates the path of the target (identiﬁ  ed from Economic 
Report of the President [1962-81]), natural (NAIRU), and actual unemployment rates 
in the US for the period 1962-81.
In the case of the UK economy, Nelson’s ‘monetary neglect hypothesis’ is a much 
more convincing explanation of the acceleration of inﬂ  ation than any alternative. 
With the notable exception of a minority of British economists, in particular David 
Laidler [1976], the so-called ‘new inﬂ  ation’ of the early 1970s was viewed, both in 544 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the media and academia, as almost entirely a cost-push phenomena [Nelson, 2004; 
Nelson and Nikolov, 2004]. As a result, monetary policy was excessively expansion-
ary well before the OPEC oil price hike --- the inﬂ  ation Genie was already out of the 
bottle! In retrospect, the combination of Keynesian inspired wage and price controls 
aimed at defeating inﬂ  ation, combined with a ﬁ  scal and monetary expansion aimed 
at stimulating output and employment seems bizarre, but it was representative of 
the macroeconomic confusion that pervaded the UK policy debate at that time. It is 
hardly surprising that this King Canute strategy failed and, as a consequence, by 
1975 inﬂ  ation in the UK had reached 25 per cent. See Figure 2. 
 FIGURE  1 
 Unemployment Rate and Forecast Errors of the Natural Rate, US, 1962-81. 
 
Source: Reis, 2003.
NEW CLASSICAL INFLUENCES ON MACROECONOMIC POLICYMAKING
In October 1995 the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences announced its decision 
to award the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics to Robert Lucas… ‘For having 
developed and applied the hypothesis of rational expectations, and thereby having 
transformed macroeconomic analysis and deepened our understanding of economic 
policy.’ In 2004 Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott also received the Nobel Memorial 
Prize…. ‘For their contributions to dynamic macroeconomics: the time consistency 545 NEW CLASSICAL MACRODYNAMICS
of economic policy, and the driving forces behind business cycles.’ However, in com-
menting on the inﬂ  uence of new classical macroeconomics on practical policymaking, 
Seidman argues that neither the Fed, US government, or the business community, 
were persuaded by new classical thinking, and that ‘the only place that the new clas-
sical counter-revolution succeeded was in academia’ [emphasis added]. 
With respect to the business community, it is unsurprising that new classical 
theorising had little direct practical impact. However, since businesses are forward 
looking, inﬂ  ation expectations will clearly inﬂ  uence their key decisions. A monetary 
policy framework that provides more stability cannot but help establish a more favour-
able business climate conducive to long-term planning. Since new classical thinking in 
general inﬂ  uenced the emergence of the current monetary policy frameworks of both 
the US and UK economies, as argued below, the inﬂ  uence of new classical economists 
on the business community has been indirect, but non-the-less important. As Figures 
2-4 illustrate, both the US and UK economies have experienced a ‘Great Moderation’ 
with respect to economic stability over the last twenty years, and economists such as 
Bernanke, Taylor and the Romers attribute much of this stability to improvements 
in the conduct of monetary policy. 
Did the research of Lucas and other new classical economists inﬂ  uence the conduct 
of macroeconomic policy via their contributions within academia? As a mainstream 
macroeconomist I would argue ‘yes’, for reasons developed below. 
 FIGURE  2
 Inﬂ  ation in the US and UK, 1971-2003
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  FIGURE 3    
  Real GDP Growth, US  1971-2003
 
 Source: Minford, 2006.
  FIGURE 4   
  Real GDP Growth, UK, 1971-2003
 
Source: Minford, 2006.
October 1979: A deﬁ  ning moment
Just as the ‘Wall Street Crash’ of October 1929 marked a deﬁ  ning moment in 
twentieth century US macroeconomic history, there is also general agreement among 
mainstream macroeconomists that ﬁ  fty years later, Paul Volcker’s ‘declaration of war 
on inﬂ  ation’ [Orphanides, 2006], beginning in October 1979, also marked a decisive 
turning point in post-war US macroeconomic history [Bernanke, 2005; Goodfriend, 
2005; Meltzer, 2005]. Since then, macroeconomic policy, in particular the conduct of 547 NEW CLASSICAL MACRODYNAMICS
monetary policy, has increasingly followed several important guidelines established 
by developments in macroeconomic theory, including several key contributions from 
the new classical school. 
 In a recent Journal of Economic Perspectives ‘Symposium on Macroeconomic 
Lessons’, Chari and Kehoe [2006], in contrast to the views expressed by Mankiw 
[2006a], argue that policymakers and advisors who are heavily involved with the 
‘hurly-burley of day-to-day policymaking’ often fail to appreciate the link between 
theoretical advances and practical policymaking. However, the connection is ‘easy to 
see if one steps back and takes a longer term perspective.’ Given this perspective ‘the 
most straight forward reading of developments in macroeconomic policy is that they 
were strongly inﬂ  uenced by developments in macroeconomic theory.’ To illustrate 
this point let us return to the macroeconomic debate relating to the emergence of the 
‘Great Inﬂ  ation’ during the late 1960s and 1970s, and the subsequent ‘Great Modera-
tion’ of the post-1984 period.
The ideas hypothesis
As already noted, there are several plausible explanations of the emergence of 
the ‘Great Inﬂ  ation.’ One persuasive explanation is the ‘ideas hypothesis.’ This hy-
pothesis emphasises a number of policy errors that had their origins in a mainstream 
acceptance of a defective Keynesian theoretical framework that encouraged monetary 
policy to become ‘unusually prone to creating volatility during the late 1960s and the 
1970s’ [Bernanke, 2004a]. This framework downplayed the importance of inﬂ  ation 
relative to unemployment, neglected the inﬂ  uence of endogenously determined inﬂ  a-
tionary expectations, displayed undue optimism about the ability of policymakers to 
use both ﬁ  scal and monetary policy to ‘ﬁ  ne tune’ the economy, gave too much weight 
to non-monetary forces (cost-push shocks) as contributing factors to rising inﬂ  ation 
while neglecting the inﬂ  uence of monetary factors, and accepted unrealistically low 
estimates of the sustainable (natural) rate of unemployment [De Long, 1997; Or-
phanides, 2003; Nelson, 2004]. 
One important variant of the ‘ideas hypothesis’ is the ‘Berkeley Story’ advocated 
by Christina and David Romer [2002]. They place great emphasis, on the adoption of 
a defective model (a stable, policy invariant long-run Phillips curve), and underesti-
mation of the natural rate of unemployment, as an explanation of US macroeconomic 
instability in the late 1960s and 1970s [Sargent, 2002; Meltzer, 2006]. The Romers 
also highlight the importance of the selection of Federal Reserve Chairmen, because 
the ‘history of the Federal Reserve shows that ideas have been crucial’ [Romer and 
Romer, 2002, 2004]. Their research shows that ‘the key determinant of the quality 
of monetary policy has been policymaker’s beliefs about how the economy functions 
and what monetary policy can accomplish.’ As Romer [2005] argues…. ‘Perhaps the 
strongest evidence that the Great Inﬂ  ation in the United States and elsewhere was 
the result of ideas is the fact that ideas ended it…. Like all revolutions, the Volcker 
revolution was a triumph of better ideas over worse ones.’ 
During the last twenty years there has been a substantial reduction in macro-
economic volatility in the US economy (see Figures 2 – 4). This ‘Great Moderation’, 548 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
in Fed Chairman Bernanke’s language, is due in large measure to improvements in 
monetary policy which ‘deserves more credit than it has received in the literature’ 
[Bernanke, 2004a]. A strong case can be made that this policy success can be linked 
to the development of a number of important ideas [Taylor, 1992; Bernanke, 2003, 
2004b, 2005; Goodfriend, 2004, 2005; Mishkin, 2006], namely: (i) there is no long-run 
Phillips curve trade-off between inﬂ  ation and unemployment; (ii) inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions are dependent on the monetary policy regime and consequently the success of 
monetary policy outcomes depend critically on establishing ‘tightly anchored’ expecta-
tions; (iii) an end to the conviction, held by many Keynesians during the 1970s, that 
monetary policy is a defective weapon for combating inﬂ  ation, and that disinﬂ  ation 
involves a politically unacceptable ‘sacriﬁ  ce ratio;’ (iv) a long-run commitment to low 
and stable inﬂ  ation as a key prerequisite for achieving both economic efﬁ  ciency and 
sustainable growth, i.e., inﬂ  ation, especially high and volatile inﬂ  ation, has signiﬁ  -
cant costs; (v) the time-inconsistency problem plagues monetary policy and provides 
an important rationale behind the decision in many countries to adopt an inﬂ  ation 
target as the nominal anchor; (vi) the effectiveness of monetary policy is dependent 
on the credibility and reputation of the policymaker; (vii) the efﬁ  cacy of monetary 
policy is substantially improved by central bank independence; (viii) to achieve good 
outcomes from monetary policy it is necessary to establish a strong nominal anchor; 
(ix) a consensus has emerged during the last twenty years that a ‘constrained discre-
tion’ framework for monetary policy represents a superior ‘middle ground’ between 
‘iron clad rules’ and ‘unfettered discretion’ [Bernanke, 2003]. 
While the Friedman-Phelps critique of the Phillips curve clearly played a very 
important role, especially in the development of the ﬁ  rst four ideas, it is also the case 
that the emphasis given to rational expectations by Robert Lucas, together with the 
seminal contributions of Kydland and Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983], 
reinforced the Friedman-Phelps arguments, and stimulated and encouraged the subse-
quent monetary policy research [Phelps, 1967; Friedman, 1968a; Snowdon and Vane, 
2006]. This research eventually culminated in a theoretical framework supportive 
of the current monetary policy consensus that emphasises credibility, central bank 
independence, and a nominal anchor based on an inﬂ  ation target (see points (v) to 
(ix) above, and Barro [2005]). It should be noted that the current consensus favouring 
central bank independence is very much based on new classical rather than monetarist 
inﬂ  uence since Friedman ‘categorically rejected central bank independence’ in favor 
of a strict k% monetary rule (see [Friedman, 1968b]; [Bibow, 2004]). 
Credibility and monetary policy effectiveness 
The importance of credibility of pronouncements on monetary policy by central 
banks has long been appreciated [Blinder, 1998,1999, 2002]. However, according to 
Bernanke [2005]… ‘in the late 1960s and 1970s, as the US inﬂ  ation crisis was building, 
economists and policymakers did not fully understand or appreciate the determinants 
of credibility and its link to policy outcomes.’ This changed after the publication in 
1977 of the classic Kydland and Prescott contribution, ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: 
The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans.’ This paper, more than any other new classical 549 NEW CLASSICAL MACRODYNAMICS
contribution, provides a clear exposition of why credibility is so important to the effec-
tive conduct of monetary policy, and consequently ‘has been a major inﬂ  uence on the 
practice of central banking and ﬁ  scal policymaking over the last thirty years’ [Chari 
and Kehoe, 2006]. However, as Bernanke emphasises, this contribution ‘largely left 
open the critical issue of how a central bank is supposed to obtain credibility in the ﬁ  rst 
place’ [Bernanke, 2005, emphasis added]. With a Friedman-Lucas-Kydland-Prescott 
hard-core monetarist k% monetary growth rate rule ruled out on practical grounds 
due to instability in the velocities of monetary aggregates, the ﬁ  eld was open for an 
alternative approach. 
Kenneth Rogoff [1985] provided the key contribution by suggesting a two-pronged 
strategy of appointing an inﬂ  ation-averse central banker (an ‘inﬂ  ation hawk’) combined 
with an institutional structure specifying a strong nominal anchor and a guarantee 
of central bank independence. The contacting approach suggested by Walsh [1995], 
which speciﬁ  es explicit performance benchmarks for central bankers in order to in-
crease accountability and transparency, should also be viewed as a major contribution 
to the post-Kydland and Prescott literature that highlights central bank credibility 
as an important prerequisite for monetary policy effectiveness. 
 In his Nobel Memorial Lecture, Edward Prescott [2006], in discussing his con-
tribution to the time-inconsistency insight concludes that:
The increased stability of the economy and the improved performance 
of the payment and credit system may be due in part to the diffusion of 
ﬁ  ndings of Finn’s and my ‘Rules Rather than Discretion’ paper. People 
now recognise much better the importance of having good macroeco-
nomic institutions such as an independent central bank.
The New Neoclassical Synthesis: Inﬂ  ation targeting as ‘constrained discretion’
An increasing consensus of economists now support the case for constrained dis-
cretion in some form of activist rule. Indeed, during the last decade of the twentieth 
century, macroeconomics began to evolve into what Goodfriend and King [1997] have 
called a ‘New Neoclassical Synthesis’ (NNS). Goodfriend [2004] argues that…. ‘Great 
progress was made in the theory of monetary policy in the last quarter century. Theory 
advanced on both the classical and Keynesian sides….The New Neoclassical Synthesis 
incorporates elements from both the classical and Keynesian perspectives into a single 
framework.’ The central elements of this new synthesis involve:
(i)  the need for macroeconomic models to take into account inter-temporal opti-
misation (new classical/real business cycle); 
(ii)  the widespread use of the rational expectations hypothesis (new classical) in 
both a forward looking aggregate demand (IS) and aggregate supply func-
tion; 
(iii)  recognition of the importance of imperfect competition in goods, labour, and 
credit markets (new Keynesian); 
(iv)  incorporating costly price adjustment into macroeconomic models (new Keynesian).550 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Goodfriend argues that… ‘The modelling of expected future income in the IS 
function and expected future inﬂ  ation in the aggregate supply function reﬂ  ects the 
inﬂ  uence of rational expectations into macroeconomics by Robert Lucas in the 1970s.’ 
Furthermore, ‘the assumption of rational expectations as a modelling device is now 
entirely orthodox’ [Woodford, 2000]. As is evident from their structure, NNS models 
encompass key elements from both new classical and new Keynesian theorising [Calvo, 
1983; Gali, 2002; Goodfriend, 2004, 2005]. In turn, new classical and new Keynesian 
models retain important elements of earlier Keynesian and monetarist thinking. This 
‘new paradigm’ integrates Keynesian elements such as nominal rigidities and imperfect 
competition into a real business cycle dynamic general equilibrium framework (in a 
recent paper, Minford [2006] advocates using ﬂ  exi-price ‘new classical’ or even ‘just 
plain classical models’ for guiding monetary policy in a world of low inﬂ  ation. In his 
view the testing of NNS and new classical models has ‘not reached anywhere near a 
conclusion.’ Minford also favours a price level, rather than inﬂ  ation target).
How do these developments relate to monetary policy? According to Goodfriend 
and King the NNS models suggest four major conclusions about the role of monetary 
policy. First, monetary policy has persistent effects on real variables due to gradual 
price adjustment. Second, there is ‘little’ long-run trade-off between real and nominal 
variables. Third, inﬂ  ation has signiﬁ  cant welfare costs due to its distorting impact 
on economic performance. Fourth, in understanding the effects of monetary policy, 
it is important to take into account the credibility of policy. According to Goodfriend 
and King this implies that monetary policy is best conducted within a rules based 
framework with central banks adopting a regime of inﬂ  ation targeting [Bernanke and 
Mishkin, 1997; Bernanke and Woodford, 2004]. 
Strong advocates of explicit inﬂ  ation targeting, such as Bernake, Mishkin, and 
Svensson, believe that any inﬂ  ation targeting monetary policy regime needs to be 
‘ﬂ  exible’ in the sense ‘that it involves some concern about the stability of the real 
economy’ [Svensson, 2003]. The need for ﬂ  exibility can in part be illustrated by 
considering a conventional form of the loss function (Lt) assigned to central bankers 
given by equation (1). 
(1)      L Lt t =   = λ λ (  (π πt t −   − π πT T )  )   
2  2 +  + Φ Φ( (y yt t* *)  ) 2 2 ,   , λ λ > 0,   > 0, Φ Φ > 0  > 0
In this quadratic social loss function πt is the rate of inﬂ  ation at time period t, 
πT is the inﬂ  ation target, and yt* represents the percentage output gap, or deviation 
of real GDP (Yt) from the trend of potential (‘not overambitious’) GDP, Yt*. There-
fore, yt* =[(Yt -Yt*)/Yt*]·100. The parameters λ  λ and Φ  Φ are the relative weights given 
to achieving the inﬂ  ation target and stabilising the output gap. For strict inﬂ  ation 
targeting, Φ Φ = 0  = 0, whereas with ﬂ  exible inﬂ  ation targeting, Φ Φ > 0  > 0. As Svensson notes, 
‘no central bank with an explicit inﬂ  ation target seems to behave as if it wishes to 
achieve the target at all cost.’ Setting Φ Φ = 0  = 0 would be the policy stance adopted by 
those who Mervyn King [1997] describes as ‘inﬂ  ation nutters’, and all countries that 
have introduced inﬂ  ation targeting have rightly built in an element of ﬂ  exibility to 
the target. Thus a rules based framework involves the ‘formulation of clear objectives 
for monetary policy and the creation of institutional commitment to those objectives’ 
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In contrast to Professor Seidman’s arguments, I believe that the modern emphasis 
coming out of the NNS monetary policy literature, on longer time horizons, policy rules, 
the design of institutions, credibility and central bank independence, as well as the 
downplaying of the role of discretionary countercyclical ﬁ  scal policy, has been heavily 
inﬂ  uenced by new classical ideas [King, 1997; 2004; Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999; 
2000; Taylor, 1999]. Clarida et al. [2000] point out that…‘The idea that expectations 
may matter in generating inﬂ  ation and that credibility is important in policy-mak-
ing were simply not well established’ during the 1960s and 1970s. That expectations 
and credibility are now well entrenched ideas that inﬂ  uence central bank monetary 




According to Goodfriend and King [1997], the NNS ideas relating to monetary 
policy ‘are consistent with the public statements of central bankers from a wide range 
of countries’ as well as the models used within central banks for policy analysis and 
forecasting (for example, see the Bank of England’s macroeconometric model [Bank 
of England, 1999, 2004]). Moreover, Goodfriend is quite explicit that:
Modern models of interest rate policy owe more to post-monetarist
rational expectations reasoning and notions of credibility and commit-
ment to policy rules born of the rational expectations revolution
This view is backed up in an interview given by Ben Bernanke [2002], four years 
before becoming Chair of the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System. In 
responding to a question relating to the inﬂ  uence of Robert Lucas on macroeconomic 
policymaking he commented as follows:
The main contribution of Robert Lucas is his insistence that we should 
think about monetary regimes as rules and as frameworks, rather than 
discretionary choices made day-by-day as events unfold. I would argue 
that is what inﬂ  ation targeting is about. ….it is a very clear framework 
for stated objectives and operating procedures in the conduct of 
monetary policy. It tries to change the public’s perceptions of how 
monetary policy operates.
While Greenspan’s ‘risk management’ approach to monetary policy has been 
widely discussed [Greenspan, 2003, 2004; Blinder and Reis, 2005; Friedman, B. 2006; 
Mankiw, 2006b], Mishkin [2004], advocates a monetary policy regime of ‘constrained 
discretion’, via the adoption of an explicit inﬂ  ation target by the Fed, because it ‘has 
the potential to reduce the likelihood that the central bank will fall into the time-in-
consistency trap’ (since September, 2006, Mishkin has been a member of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve). In any case, Taylor [2005] does not ﬁ  nd Greenspan’s 
‘Risk Management’ approach to monetary policy to be incompatible with ‘several good 
monetary principles’ embedded in the well-known algebraic ‘Taylor rule’ shown in 552 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
equation 2 [Taylor, 1993], including a commitment to price stability, the ‘greater than 
one principle (i.e., the nominal interest rate, i, should rise more than the increase in 
inﬂ  ation), a positive ‘neutral’ real rate of interest, r*, that the Φ parameter is positive, 
and recognition that policy will frequently need to be pre-emptive. 
(2)  Taylor Rule  i = r* + πt + λ[πt − πT] + Φ[ yt*] 
In the UK, Mervyn King [2005], Governor of the Bank of England, also implicitly 
acknowledges the inﬂ  uence of new classical thinking on practical policymaking in 
the following statement:
A key motivation for the study of monetary policy rules was the insight 
that if economic agents base their decisions on expectations of the fu-
ture then the way monetary policy is expected to be conducted in the 
future affects economic outcomes today. Hence it is very important to 
think about how policy inﬂ  uences the expectations of the private sec-
tor…The academic literature on monetary policy rules has performed 
a great service in emphasising the importance of expectations.
The Bank of England’s new quarterly macroeconometric model (BEQM), introduced 
in January 2005, together with the previous Medium-Term Macro Model (MTMM), 
both display new classical inﬂ  uences [Bank of England, 1999, 2004]. In particular, the 
BEQM contains ‘more explicit forward looking representations of agents’ expectations 
about the future,’ a recognition that agents form expectations on the basis of ‘limited 
information,’ a ‘more micro-founded theoretical structure,’ and a recognition of the 
importance of a policy rule in order to anchor inﬂ  ation in the long run.
Finally, Alan Greenspan [2003] has indicated that in designing monetary policy, 
the US Fed ‘has drawn on the work of analysts, both inside and outside the Fed, who 
over the past half century have devoted much effort to improving our understanding 
of the economy and its monetary transmission mechanism.’ He goes on:
 
A critical result has been the identiﬁ  cation of a relatively small set of 
key relationships that, taken together, provide a useful approxima-
tion of our economy’s dynamics. Such an approximation underlies the  
statistical models that we at the Federal Reserve employ to assess the 
likely inﬂ  uence of our policy decision.
It would be astonishing if the work of new classical analysts had not inﬂ  uenced 
the construction of these statistical models and Taylor [1997b] conﬁ  rms that mac-
roeconomic models with rational expectations are regularly used by the Fed to help 
guide monetary policy decisions about the setting of interest rates. 
Economic Report of the President
When John Taylor was a member of the President’s Council of Economic Advi-
sors (1989-91) he co-authored the 1990 Economic Report of the President. Chapter 553 NEW CLASSICAL MACRODYNAMICS
3 of that document provides a ‘translation’ of the previous twenty years of academic 
research in order to make the case for policy rules. Prominence is given to issues 
relating to the importance of credibility, the design of macroeconomic policies, the 
advantages of systematic policies, time inconsistency, the importance of achieving 
low and stable inﬂ  ation, and the importance of distinguishing between the short-run 
and long-run Phillips curve trade–off . According to Taylor [1998b] the 1990 Report 
‘helped to pave the way to the application of policy rules in practice’ and central 
bankers ‘now emphasise the importance of following systematic policies with clearly 
stated credible goals.’ 
One good measure of the extent to which macroeconomic research has changed 
economists views of macroeconomic policy is to compare the 1962 Economic Report 
of the President with the 1990 Report [Tobin, 1987; Solow and Tobin, 1988; Solow 
and Taylor, 1998].The change of emphasis with respect to practical policymaking 
in Chapter 3 of the 1990 Report is striking compared to Chapter 1 of the (orthodox 
Keynesian) 1962 Report. While the latter articulates a strong case for ‘Full Employ-
ment as the Objective of Stabilisation Policy’, to be achieved through the ‘essential’ 
application of discretionary ﬁ  scal and monetary policy, the 1990 Report emphasises 
the costs of inﬂ  ation, and the importance of ‘forward- looking’ expectations and cred-
ibility in the formulation of policy (see pages 77 – 88 of the 1990 Report). It is clear 
that the authors of the 1990 Report, including Taylor, see a direct link coming from 
academia to practical policymaking when they note that:
recent economic research and practical experience, while supporting 
the view that macroeconomic policy has powerful effects, lead to the 
conclusion that discretionary macroeconomic policies can be detrimen-
tal to good economic performance. Instead policies should be designed 
to work with a minimum of discretion, with a clear focus on the longer 
term, and with allowance for contingencies [emphasis added].
While Chapter 1 of the 1962 Report highlights involuntary unemployment (the 
concept appears three times in the ﬁ  rst six pages), the 1990 Report makes no mention 
of this key orthodox Keynesian idea (see below).
Woodford’s model
Another metric of the extent to which macroeconomics has changed and progressed 
is reﬂ  ected in the work on monetary policy by Michael Woodford. For example, sub-
stantial differences are apparent when comparing the neoclassical synthesis orthodoxy 
of Don Patinkin’s Money, Interest and Prices [1956] with Michael Woodford’s NNS 
(or neo Wicksellian) Interest and Prices [2003]. The workhorse model in Woodford’s 
seminal work is one that bears the heavy imprint of both new classical and new 
Keynesian ideas. 
In Chapter 1 of Interest and Prices, Woodford is quite explicit that his book is 
intended to rehabilitate the case for systematic stabilisation policy aimed at achieving 
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to monetary policy’, taking into account endogenous rational expectations [Muth, 
1961], the new classical critique [Lucas, 1976], and using the tools of intertemporal 
equilibrium modelling developed in the wake of Kydland and Prescott’s 1982 paper, 
[Prescott, 2006]. To Woodford, the real business cycle model is a useful ‘building bloc’ in 
establishing an important ‘benchmark’ description of the dynamic path of output. The 
output path described in such models represents a ‘virtual equilibrium’ (natural) level 
of output ‘that would occur in an equilibrium with ﬂ  exible wages and prices.’ However, 
Woodford’s key to obtaining ‘less trivial consequences of systematic monetary policy’ 
than came out of the early ﬂ  exi-price, competitive, new classical monetary models, 
is to adopt the assumption of wage and price inertia in the spirit of new Keynesian 
models. Inﬂ  ation dynamics and rules based policy prescriptions are then related to 
actual output relative to its natural rate.
In his review of Interest and Prices, Green [2005] argues that Woodford’s book ‘is 
likely to be a bible for central bank economists who regard themselves as having a 
public charge to design and implement stabilisation policy.’ In Woodford’s words:
What appears to be developing, then, at the turn of another century 
is a new consensus in favour of monetary policy that is disciplined 
by clear rules intended to ensure a stable standard of value, rather 
than one that is determined on a purely discretionary basis to serve 
whatever ends may seem most pressing at any time….there are im-
portant advantages of commitment to a policy other than discretionary 
optimisation.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AGAINST THE NEW CLASSICAL COUNTER-
REVOLUTION 
I agree with Seidman that the empirical evidence is not supportive of the Ricard-
ian equivalence theorem. Lucas’s monetary equilibrium theory of the business cycle 
also failed to stand up to empirical scrutiny. However, with respect to the 1982 reces-
sion, while new classical predictions of the costs of disinﬂ  ation were too optimistic, 
Keynesian predictions, based on their wage and price equations, were too pessimistic. 
Furthermore, real business cycle theory has also been integrated into mainstream 
NNS models as well as providing new empirical insights into the length of the 1930s 
Great Depression.
The 1982 recession
By 1979 the theoretical debate in macroeconomics indicated that the sacriﬁ  ce ratio 
arising from a policy of disinﬂ  ation would be smaller if (i) the policy was announced 
in advance, (ii) is credible, (iii) expectations are forward looking, and (iv) prices and 
wages are responsive to aggregate demand conditions [Chadha et al.,1992]. One 
interpretation of the recession induced by the Volcker disinﬂ  ation is that, due to the 
erosion of the Fed’s anti-inﬂ  ation credibility during the 1970s, by 1979 the Fed was 
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[2004] provide evidence from FOMC deliberations that the time inconsistency problem 
‘provides a plausible explanation of the rise of inﬂ  ation in the 1970s.’ Their argument 
does not concentrate on the idea of the Fed attempting to spring inﬂ  ationary surprises 
in order to drive unemployment below the natural rate. Rather, due to the Fed’s lack 
of credibility, once caught in a high inﬂ  ation time consistent equilibrium, policymakers 
perceived correctly that any attempt at aggressive disinﬂ  ation by the Fed was likely 
to lead to a high ‘sacriﬁ  ce ratio’ in terms of lost output and higher unemployment (see 
also, Chappell, McGregor and Vermilyea [2005]). As events turned out, the sacriﬁ  ce 
ratio was greater than anticipated by the new classicals, and less than anticipated 
by the Keynesian pessimists, some of whom favoured the use of some form of prices 
and incomes policy (see Tobin [1980, 1987]; Snowdon and Vane [2002]).
 
Real business cycle theory
Numerous criticisms have been levelled at real business cycle theory [Gali and 
Rabanal, 2005]. However, since real business cycle methodology is, in principle, ideo-
logically neutral, it has the capability of fostering models with enormous diversity, 
and forms the ‘core’ of NNS models [Goodfriend, 2005]. As Woodford [2003] points 
out… ‘ﬂ  exible price real business cycle models of aggregate ﬂ  uctuations are of practical 
interest, not as descriptions of what aggregate ﬂ  uctuations should be like regardless 
of the monetary policy regime, but as descriptions of what they would be like under 
an optimal monetary policy regime.’ Without question, real business cycle theorists 
have challenged conventional wisdom by raising profound questions relating to the 
meaning, signiﬁ  cance and characteristics of economic ﬂ  uctuations. However, when 
it comes to explaining events such as the initial causes of the Great Depression, real 
business cycle theorists have failed to ﬁ  nd a convincing explanation that comes any-
where near to matching those that focus on aggregate demand shocks [Bernanke, 
2002]. Nevertheless, it is important to note that during recent years several economists 
have begun to investigate economic depressions using neoclassical growth theory 
[Pensieroso, 2007]. 
Cole and Ohanian [1999] were the ﬁ  rst economists to study the Great Depression 
from a real business cycle theory perspective. They attempt to account not only for 
the downturn in GDP in the period 1929-33, but also seek to explain the slow recov-
ery of output between 1934 and 1939. Cole and Ohanian [2002a; 2002b] argue that 
the weak recovery process was mainly due to the adverse consequences of New Deal 
policies, particularly policies related to the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) 
of 1933, and National Labour Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935. Both Acts, they claim, 
distorted the efﬁ  cient working of markets by increasing monopoly power and encour-
aging ﬁ  rms to grant large pay increases for incumbent workers (see also Benjamin 
and Kochin [1979]). 
It is interesting to note that, during the 1970s and 1980s, both Lucas and Prescott 
were reluctant to apply equilibrium theorizing to explain the Great Depression. During 
the 1990s Prescott changed his mind while Lucas remained committed to the Fried-
man-Schwartz [1963] monetary explanation (see Prescott [1999, 2002]; Chari et al. 
[2002]; De Vroey and Pensieroso [2006]). 
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NEW CLASSICAL INFLUENCES IN THE TEXTBOOKS AND ACADEMIA: 
SOME OBSERVATIONS
While Seidman is correct in his observation that the ‘undergraduate textbooks that 
dominate the market continue to use a Keynesian framework’ (IS-LM-AD-AS) as their 
basis, even a casual comparison of Ackley’s [1961] or Lindauer’s [1971] macroeconomic 
textbooks, with their well-known modern counterparts, reveals many key changes 
inﬂ  uenced by the ‘new classical counter-revolution.’ As Table 1 illustrates, with the 
exception of the Lucas critique and calibration techniques, all the other major new 
classical contributions, appropriate at the undergraduate level, are well represented 
(perhaps the most remarkable change has been the almost complete disappearance 
in textbooks and the macroeconomics literature of Keynes’s concept of ‘involuntary 
unemployment’ [Lucas, 1978; Tobin, 1987; Blinder, 1988a; De Vroey, 2004. See also, 
Table 1 in Snowdon [2006]). 
In his critique of new classical economics, Seidman also notes that the ‘driving 
force behind new classical models in academia was the new set of mathematical models 
that it provided for PhD candidates and assistant professors‘ and consequently ‘new 
classical economics will last a long time in academia.’ I agree (see Johnson [1971]; 
Snowdon and Vane [1996]). Reﬂ  ecting Lucas’s methodological preferences, there is no 
question that the new classical revolution involved the introduction of new quantitative 
techniques not found in the ‘kit bags of the older economists’ [Blinder, 1988b]. Lucas 
ﬁ  rmly believes that the only way to formulate a problem in economic theory is to do it 
mathematically…..‘mathematical analysis is not one of many ways of doing economic 
theory. It is the only way. Economic theory is mathematical analysis. Everything else 
is just pictures and talk’ (quoted in Warsh [2006, 168]). 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Seidman’s critique of new classical economics, especially with respect 
to its inﬂ  uence outside academia, is to be welcomed even though I disagree with his 
negative assessment of the contribution of new classical theorists to progress within 
the ﬁ  eld. As is the case with most revolutions in economics, exaggerated claims have 
been made on behalf of new classical economics and the demise of the Keynesian ap-
proach to macroeconomic analysis. Nevertheless, in this paper I have argued that the 
transformation of macroeconomics, both theory and policy, during the last thirty ﬁ  ve 
years has been considerable, and the inﬂ  uence and contribution of economists such as 
Robert Lucas and Edward Prescott has been signiﬁ  cant. New classical economics has 
not been a false path but an illuminating complement to mainstream developments in 
both macroeconomic theory and policy and numerous new classical insights now form 
part of the mainstream core. As Blanchard [2000] highlights, in his eve of millennium 
survey of macroeconomics, the new Keynesian and new classical research routes, that 
seemed so divisive during the 1980s, have ‘surprisingly converged.’ The fact that the 
1970s-style market clearing monetary models of the business cycle did not stand the 
test of time does not mean that important insights were not forthcoming from this 
research programme, leading to modiﬁ  cations and improvements to the mainstream 
macroeconomic models [Lucas, 1996]. 557 NEW CLASSICAL MACRODYNAMICS
 TABLE  1
  The New Classical Content of Macroeconomic Textbooks
Major Ackley  Abel  Blanchard  Colander  Delong  Froyen  Dornbusch,  Gordon  Hall  Mankiw
New  1961  and  (2003)  and  (2002)  (2002) Fischer (2003)  and    (2007)
Classical  Lindauer  Bernanke   Gamber    and  Startz   Papell
Contributions  1971  (2005)   (2002)     (2004)   (2005) 
Rational  No       Yes        Y        Y      Y      Y        Y       Y     Y     Y
Expectations





Time        N       Y        Y        Y      Y      Y        Y       Y     Y      Y
Inconsistency
Policy        N       Y        Y        Y      Y      Y       Y       Y     Y      Y
Credibility
Rules  Ackley       Y        Y        Y      Y      Y       Y       Y     Y      Y
    v        N                 
Discretion  Lindauer                    
       Y   
             
Lucas Critique       N       Y       Y        N      Y      N       Y       N     Y      Y
                       




Ricardian       N       Y       Y       Y      Y      N       Y       Y     Y      Y
Equivalence




Calibration       N       Y       N       N      N      N       Y       N     N      N
Techniques
 
Controversy and dialogue have been, and will continue to be, a major engine 
for the accumulation of new knowledge and progress in macroeconomics. The 1970s 
‘Lucasian revolution’ [Blinder, 2002] certainly forced Keynesians to rethink the pre-
vailing conventional macroeconomic wisdom, and the gradual emergence of a ‘New 
Neoclassical Synthesis’ in the 1990s reﬂ  ects a thirty year journey of genuine progress 
in the ﬁ  eld. I leave the ﬁ  nal words to Chari and Kehoe [2006]:
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Macroeconomics is now ﬁ  rmly grounded in the principles of economic 
theory. These advances have not been restricted to the ivory tower. 
Over the last several decades, the United States and other countries 
have undertaken a variety of policy changes that are precisely what 
macroeconomic theory of the last thirty years suggests.
 NOTES
  The author would like to thank three anonymous referees, Professor Patrick Minford, and  Professor 
Howard Vane, for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The views expressed  here 
are those of the author.
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